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Abstract:  Egalitarian  theorists,  since  Rawls,  have  in  the  main  advocated
equalizing some objective measure of individual well-being, such as primary
goods, functioning, or resources, rather than subjective welfare. This discussion,
however, has assumed, implicitly, a static environment. By analyzing a society
that survives for many generations, we demonstrate that equality of opportunity
for some objective condition is incompatible with human development over time.
We argue that this incompatibility can be resolved by equalizing opportunities for
welfare. Thus, ‘subjectivism’ seems necessary if we are to hope for a society
which can both equalize opportunities and support the development of human
capacity over time.
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1. Introduction. 
  Egalitarians - and more specifically, socialists - have long cherished two 
ideals: that that society is best which promotes human development over time, and 
equality of condition among members of society.
1 More recently, since Rawls’s 
rejuvenation of egalitarian studies, several qualifications have been put forth as to 
what the equalisandum should be. Most, although not all, participants in the 
discussion have advocated what we call an objectivist view, that the equalisandum 
should be something which is measurable independently of the views of the 
individuals who have it - primary goods, functionings, or resources (Rawls (1971), 
Sen (1980), and Dworkin (1981), respectively). The principal non-objectivist 
equalisandum is, of course, welfare or utility, which can only be measured knowing 
the utility function of the individual in question, and can only be compared 
interpersonally if an interpersonally comparable unit scale exists. None of the major 
writers advocates equality of welfare as an ethic.  
  Moreover, in recent years, various theories of equal opportunity have been 
proposed including Arneson (1989), Cohen (1989), and Roemer (1998), and we 
would say that Dworkin’s (1981) equality-of-resources is indeed an equal-opportunity 
theory as well. So we might well say that egalitarians advocate, as well as human 
                                                 
1 Socialists have said (before consciousness about gender-neutral language) that, in the good society 
there will be ‘self-realization of man’ and ‘self-realization of men.’ The latter means that, over the 
course of a life, a person becomes self-realized, in the sense of developing her capacities. The former 
means that, over generations, human beings become more knowledgeable and developed. Here, we 
take human development to mean ‘self-realization of man.’  2 
development, equality of opportunity for some condition. That condition could be 
something objective like functionings or primary goods, or the subjective welfare.  
What we argue in this article is that the three desiderata  
1.  protracted human development; 
2.  equality of opportunity for some condition; 
3.  the condition be an objective characteristic of the individual; 
are inconsistent. Because the first desideratum makes sense only in a dynamic 
context, equality of condition, or equality of opportunity for some condition, becomes 
equality (of opportunity) among all adults who ever live. Our claim says that if the 
equalisandum is objective - something like functioning - then achieving such equality 
will imply the absence of human development over time. It is only by taking the 
equalisandum to be welfare of a particular kind, a non-objectivist concept, that 
equality of opportunity is consistent with human development. 
  If our claimed inconsistency is correct, then egalitarians are faced with a 
choice: either dropping their advocacy of equality (of opportunity), or of human 
development, or of objectivist equalisanda. We think that the most attractive choice is 
to drop the objectivist view.  
  In other words, we claim to show that, if we move away from the static 
thought experiments imagined by Rawls and the objectivist writers heretofore, then 
objectivism ceases to be attractive (if it ever was). We must say, however, that our 
inquiry does not show that justice requires that we endorse subjectivism (the view 
that welfare is what must count for an egalitarian). For we advocate dropping  3 
objectivism because of its inconsistency with equality of opportunity and human 
development; and while the equality-of-opportunity part of that compound phrase 
refers to a state of justice, the ‘human development’ part does not. That is, we do not 
claim that justice requires human development, or even, more weakly, that justice 
requires human development in an environment where it is possible. Human 
development over time is, for us, an obvious good, but we do not know what to call 
the state of a society which has it, the way a society with equality of opportunity is in 
a state of justice.  
 
2. The dynamic environment. 
  We will model the problem in a stark way. There is a society that exists for 
many (an infinite) number of generations. At each generation there are adults and 
children. Each adult has one child, and so the population size is constant. Adults, at 
least at the beginning date zero (0), have different wage rates - indeed, we shall seek 
simplicity by declaring that only two wage rates exist at date 0. Taxation of adult 
income is used to finance education of that generation’s children, as well as to 
redistribute income among adults.  
  We suppose that an adult’s wage is a measure of her family’s socio-economic 
status (SES), where SES has an impact on the docility
2 of children. More specifically, 
the economic outcome of educating a child is the wage she will earn as an adult, and 
it takes more educational resources to bring a low SES child up to a given (adult) 
                                                 
2 In the classical sense -- educability.  4 
wage rate than it does a high SES child. We take the view that all children have 
identical inborn talent, and that the wage a child eventually earns as an adult is a 
function of her talent, the educational resources invested in her, and the SES status of 
her parent, our summary of the environmental factor. To be specific, we suppose 
there are two functions h: R+ → R+ and g: R+ → R+ such that a child of a parent who 
has a wage of w will, as an adult, earn a wage of h(x)g(w), if x is the fraction of GNP 
per capita that is invested in her through the educational process. We assume: 
Assumption 1: h and g are continuous and strictly increasing. Moreover, h(0) = 0 and 
g(0) = 0. 
  Our economic environment dispenses with two important aspects of reality - 
that children are differentially talented, and that children expend differential effort
3 - 
since we think they are unnecessary to expose the problem we want to concentrate 
upon. Capital and natural resources exist only implicitly in this model. 
  At each generation, adults must tax themselves, and the tax revenues, in the 
form of educational finance, must be distributed between the two types of child, those 
from low wage parents and those from high wage parents. The result of that education 
will be adults at the next date who have (perhaps) two wage levels, and the problem 
                                                 
3 One is, of course, free to interpret the difficulty in educating low SES children as due to their lower 
talent. This is formally equivalent to our model, yet might lead to different ethics. (Some would say 
that it’s alright for low talent people to earn less than high talent people, although it’s not alright for 
kids from disadvantaged backgrounds to earn less than equally talented kids from advantaged 
backgrounds.)  5 
repeats itself. All children of a given SES receive the same educational investment, 
and hence have the same wage as adults.  
  We shall suppose that taxation takes the following form. First, all adult 
incomes are pooled, and each adult receives the average income. Then each adult 
pays the same fraction of her income as a tax. At date 0, a fraction fL of the adults earn 
the low wage wL
0, and fraction fH earn the high wage, wH
0. Thus, fL + fH = 1, and we 
define mean income at date 0 as µ
0 = fL wL
0 + fH wH
0. If the tax rate is τ
0, then the after-
tax income of every adult is (1 - τ
0) µ
o. 
  We wish to abstract from incentive problems; in particular, taxation does not 
alter labor supply, nor does anticipation of their future after-tax income affect how 
hard children work in school. These would be poor assumptions if we were interested 
in advising policy-makers, but our investigation here is of a different kind. We are 
interested in exposing certain logical inconsistencies in a conception of ‘the good 
society’, and it is appropriate for this inquiry to assume that individual citizens are 
almost perfectly cooperative. We limit their cooperative spirit only by assuming that 
private incentives would come into play if we redistributed adult income so that low 
wage earners ended up with more income that high wage earners. (The best we can do 
is to equalize all after-tax incomes.) 
  In the theory of equal opportunity (see Roemer [1998]), it is assumed that 
individuals have different circumstances and exert different efforts. Here, we abstract 
away from differential effort. A person’s circumstances -- those characteristics 
beyond her control that influence her outcome -- are two in number, the SES (wage)  6 
of her parent, and the date at which she is born. We shall take children as adults-in-
formation, and are concerned with equalizing opportunities among adults for some 
condition X, which we shall call ‘welfare.’ The instruments we have available are the 
tax rates and the distribution of educational finance among child types at each date. 
Since effort is nugatory, the theory of equal opportunity expounded in Roemer (1998) 
says that our objective is to maximize the minimal level of ‘welfare’ among all adults 
across types, where an adult’s type is a pair (w, t), w being her parent’s wage, and t 
being the date at which she is born. Informally speaking, the SES of a child’s parents 
and the date at which she is born are circumstances beyond her control, and equality 
of opportunity requires that we equalize, so far as possible, the welfare of individuals 
with such different circumstances.  
Thus, our problem is to maximize the least level of ‘welfare’ across all adults 
who ever live. To be specific, at each date we must choose a tax rate of adult income, 
τ, and, if there are adults with two wage levels (there are never more than two), an 
allocation of educational finance (rL, rH) among children of the two types, where fL rL 
+  fH rH = 1. A child from an L family will receive educational investment in the 
amount τµrL and a child from an H family will receive τµrH. Thus, if wL and wH were 
the parents’ wages, then the children will earn, as adults, h(τ rL)g(wL) and h(τ rH)g(wH). 
  We next define the notion of functioning. We say that an adult’s level of 
functioning is a function F(w,  y) of her wage, w, and her consumption (after-tax 
income), y - F: R+ x R+ → R’, where R’ represents the extended real line. We attempt 
to capture A. Sen’s (1980) idea of functioning, which G. A. Cohen (1993) has  7 
characterized as ‘midfare,’ something midway between consumption and welfare. To 
wit, we imagine that a person’s wage is a measure of her level of human capital and 
individuals derive welfare directly from their human capital. Functioning involves a 
degree of self-esteem and self-realization, and these, we propose, depend positively 
on an individual’s level of human capital. Human capital, in turn, is reflected in the 
wage. 
Let F* = inf F(w, y). In what follows we will assume: 
Assumption 2:  F is continuous and monotone increasing in both arguments. 
Furthermore, 
0 lim
→ w F(w, y) = F*, for all y, and 
0 lim
→ y F(w, y) = F*, for all w. 
In section 5, we shall assume: 
Assumption 2’: F(w, y) = γ log w + (1 - γ) log y, where 0 < γ < 1.  
 We  define  human development as an increase in functioning level of adults 
over time. We believe this is consistent with the standard concept of human 
development, which is not an increase in welfare as such, but rather an increase in 
human capacity. Capacity, in our stark model, is a function of consumption and the 
wage, or more directly, of consumption, self-esteem, and self-realization. The wage is 
important as the reflection of education; in addition, it can be argued that self-esteem 
is a capacity enhancer, and that, too, is captured by the wage. Children embody the 
knowledge of past generations, through the educational process, and we have 
attempted to capture this in our specification of the educational technology.  8 
  This model has similarities to Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta (1974), in which 
the maximin criterion was examined in a dynamic framework. The main substantive 
difference is that we posit two types of individual, at least at the early dates, while 
Arrow and Dasgupta work with a representative agent. Thus, we are interested in 
what intergenerational equality requires with respect to intra-generational wage 
differentials, a question that neither Arrow nor Dasgupta posed. 
 
3. Equality of opportunity for functioning: Model I. 
  Our first exercise is to take the ‘welfare’ of an adult to be her functioning 





1,…],                  (3.1) 
where FJ
t is the functioning level of adults in the ‘J dynasty’ at date t. The ‘low 
dynasty’ is the set of persons consisting of the low wage adults at date 0 and all their 







1,…}, where we note that rH
t is determined by rL
t via the 
accounting identity fL rL + fH rH = 1. The level of functioning of J adults at date t is FJ
t 
=  F(wJ
t, (1 - τ
t)µ
t), where µ














0}}....}}, ∀i, J = L, H.        (3.2) 
It is important to note that, at some date, the wages of the two adult types may 
be equalized, and if that is the case, then we stipulate that, thereafter, since there is  9 
only one type of child, there is no longer any decision concerning how to allocate 
educational finance - all children receive the same investment. We need not consider 
the possibility that a child in the H dynasty has a wage lower than one in the L 
dynasty at a given date, for that will never be an aspect of an optimal solution. It thus 
follows that at any date, the functioning level of L adults will be less than or equal to 
the functioning level of H adults (where L and H refer to the dynasties, not to the 
wages of particular adults), because the two types have same consumption. 
Consequently, the equality-of-opportunity program takes the form: 
  Sup Inf [FL
0, FL
1,…]         ( 3 . 1 ’) 
 s.t.    wH
t ≥ wL
t, t = 1, 2, … 
 We  immediately  observe: 
Proposition 1. Let A1, A2 hold. At the solution to (3.1’), FL
0 = FL
t, ∀t.  
Proof: 1. Clearly, 0 < τ




t = F*, and if τ
t’ → 0 then, by (3.2), FL
t 
→ F*, ∀t ≥ t’, which by A2 are certainly not optimal. 
2. Suppose FL
0 > FL
t’, some t’ > 0. Then it is possible to increase τ
0 a little and leave all 
other variables the same, so that FL
0 is still above the minimum, while, by (3.2) wL
t, 
and thus FL
t, increase ∀t > 0.  
3. Suppose FL
t’ > FL
0, t’ > 0. By part 1, decrease τ
0, …, τ
t’-1 so that consumption and 
therefore the levels of FL
t increase ∀t ≤ t’-1. Next, increase τ
t’ enough so that wJ
t, J = 
L, H, t > t’ + 1 increase. We have now increased FL
t, ∀t ≠ t’ and we can make all these 
changes in tax rates small enough so that FL
t’ is not the smallest functioning level.￿  10 
P1 establishes that equality of opportunity for functioning is inconsistent with 
human development, in the sense that a fraction fL of adults at every date remain at the 
(low) level of functioning of date 0 L adults. If, as is reasonable, fL > .5, then the 
majority of all adults are held to a low level of human capacity. 
Do the H adults get reduced, over time, to this same low level of functioning? 
Not necessarily. Let, e.g., A2’ hold: if γ is sufficiently close to 0, then consumption is 
very important in functioning, and it may pay to keep the wages of the H adults above 
the L adults’ wages in order to bring about a relatively high mean income. 
The maximin social welfare function is sometimes criticized for spending 
huge amounts of resources to raise the level of welfare of a very small group of 
individuals who are very poor welfare producing machines. Let us note this criticism 
does not apply here. Nobody is extremely handicapped in our environment - there are 
no terribly inefficient ‘welfare’-creating individuals. It is true, however, that L adults 
at date 0 comprise an arbitrarily small fraction of the adults who have lived up to date 
T, as T becomes large, and all L adults are held to their level of functioning. This is 
surely a form of ‘extremism’ of maximin, although it has a different character from 
the form of extremism we referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph. If we 
contemplate sacrificing the L adults at date 0, we are led to ask, why do they have less 
than an equal right to welfare than those at later dates? The answer ‘Because it is too 
costly to their descendents not to sacrifice them’ invites sacrificing the L adults, or 
indeed all adults, at any finite number of dates beginning at date 0. After all, this 
group, too, constitutes an arbitrarily small fraction of all adults who shall ever live.  11 
 
4. Equality of opportunity for welfare: Model II. 
  We now suppose that adults care about the functioning levels of their children, 





t is her own functioning level, FJ
t+1 is the functioning level of her 
child, and u is monotone increasing in both arguments and continuous. Hence, if u* ≡ 
inf u(FJ
t, FJ
t+1), with a slight abuse in notation, we may write u(F
*, F
*) = u*. We will 
also rule out an extreme form of altruism by assuming 




Our equal-opportunity program now becomes 
  Sup Inf [uL
0, uL
1,…]  
s.t.   wH
t ≥ wL
t, ∀t,                     (4.1) 
where the requirement wH
t ≥ wL
t, ∀t, is surely superfluous. We now have: 
Proposition 2. Let A1, A2, A3 hold. Let m denote the value of program (4.1). At the 
solution to (4.1), uL






Proof. 1. Clearly, in the optimum τ
t > 0, ∀t. Similarly, τ
t → 1 and τ
t+1 → 1 imply that 
uL
t → u*, therefore it must be either τ
t < 1, or τ
t+1 < 1, or both. 
                                                 
4 A3 shortens the proof of P2 considerably, however none of the main results changes if A3 is 
dropped. Notice that if A2’ holds and F
t → F* implies u(F
t, F
t+1) → u* (e.g. if u is additive), then τ
t < 
1, ∀t (cf. L1 below), and P2 immediately follows.  12 
2. Suppose uL
0 > m. Assume that F is defined at τ = 1. Case 1. If τ
0 < 1, increase τ
0 a 
little. This raises uL
t, ∀t > 0, and does not lower uL
0 to m. Case 2. Let τ
0 = 1, and thus 
uL
0 = u(F*, X), u(F*, X) > m. By A3 it follows that uL
1 > m, ∀τ
1, τ
2. Hence, by part 1, 
increase τ
1 a little: both uL
0 and uL
1 remain above m, while uL
t increases, ∀t ≥ 2. 
3. Suppose uL
1 > m and uL
2 > m. (The same argument holds for any two consecutive uL
t 
and uL
t+1, t ≥ 1.) Then decrease τ
1 a little, which increases uL
0 above m. Assume that F 
is defined at τ = 1. Case 1. If τ
2 < 1, increase τ
2 so that both wL
3 and wH
3 (and thus wJ
t 
and uJ




2 were initially greater than m, they still are. Hence, by part 2, it follows that uL
1 and 
uL
2 cannot be both greater than m. Case 2. Let τ
2 = 1 and thus uL
2 = u(F*, X), u(F*, X) 
> m. By A3, uL
3 > m, ∀ τ
3, τ
4. Hence, by part 1, increase τ




3 remain above m, while uL
t increases, ∀t > 3.  
If F
t is not defined in τ
t = 1, let τ
t → 1 and notice that uL
t → u(F*, X), with 
u(F*, X) > m. Then by A3 all arguments in parts 2 and 3 above follow.￿ 
  If each adult cares about her child’s and her grandchild’s level of functioning, 
then the same argument shows that no three consecutive utilities can be greater than 
the value of the program, which is achieved at date 0. Thus, allowing parents to care 
about the functioning levels of a finite sequence of their descendents does not enable 
us to escape the conclusion that protracted human development fails to occur. For it is 
                                                 
5 If h(τ
trj




1 , and g(wj
t) = () wJ









t+i, remain unchanged, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀i ≥ 2.   13 
clear that if the utility level of the L dynasty returns to uL
0 periodically, then the 
functioning level of one generation must return, periodically, to FL
0 or FL
1 or lower, by 
u’s monotonicity. In this society, history repeats itself, condemning every n
th 
generation to the level of human development of the primeval ancestor. 
  It is worth noting that u can be any continuous monotonic utility function. In 
particular, an adult may well prefer that her child functions at a higher level than she, 
in the sense that, for all X and small δ > 0, u(X - δ, X + δ) > u(X, X).
6 This is perhaps 
somewhat surprising: even if adults want their children to function at a higher level 
than themselves, there is no protracted human development in the optimum. 
 
5. Equality of opportunity for welfare: Model III. 
  We now suppose that adults care about their own level of functioning and 




t+1 ∀t ≥0; J = L, H    (5.1) 
Hence, we can write uJ
0 recursively as 











++ ∑() () β β , for any N; J = L, H 
Suppose that the discounted sum of functioning levels of this dynasty is 









 is bounded above for every feasible sequence {w
t
H, 
                                                 







L), and therefore β < 1.
7 Hence, without loss of generality, 
we can assume  lim
N→∞β
N+1u
N+1 = 0, and the utility of any adult born in period i ≥ 0 is: 








∑β ,  ∀i ≥0; J = L, H    ( 5 . 2 )  
Thus, the utility of any adult is the discounted sum of her dynasty’s levels of 
functioning. Caring about the welfare of your child forces you, implicitly, to care 
about the functioning of your descendents, all the way down. It is reasonable to 
suppose that this formulation is psychologically accurate. Are we parents content if 
our children are functioning well, or does our contentment depend upon their 
happiness, where their happiness derives from the happiness of their children? 
  Our equal-opportunity-for-welfare program is stated again as (4.1), where the 
notation now refers to the new concept of utility. Again, the value of program (4.1) is 
achieved at the date 0 utility. (If it weren’t, increase τ
0,
8 which will increase FL
t, and 
thus uL
t, ∀t ≥ 1.) Consequently, program (4.1) is equivalent to the program: 
    s u p   uL
0 
    s . t .   wH
t ≥ wL
t, ∀t     ( 5 . 3 )  
Clearly, at the solution to (5.3), we have uL
0 < uL
t, ∀t. Assume: 
Assumption 1’: 
1 ) (
c kx x h = , 
2 ) (
c w w g = , where k > 0, 0 ≤ c1, c2 ≤ 1. 
Moreover, let A2’ hold. The sequence problem (SP) can be written as  
                                                 
7 In what follows, by A1’ and A4, F is bounded above so that such a condition is satisfied. 
8 In L1 below we prove that if F is bounded above, in the solution to (4.1), it will be τ
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0. Therefore, let us first solve the single-wage SP, i.e. the SP for ρ
0 = 1. 
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=      (5.4) 
where the only instruments are tax rates - all children receive an equal per capita 
share of educational investment - and v* denotes the supremum function.  
In order to analyze the single-wage SP, let W ⊆ R+ denote the state space and 
let Γ: W → W denote the feasibility correspondence, where  ] ) ( , 0 [ ) (
2 c w k w = Γ , and 
thus Γ() w ≠∅, ∀w. Next, let A = {(w, y) ∈ W x W| y ∈ Γ(w)} be the graph of Γ. The 
one period return function at date t is a function Φ: A → R’ whose value is F(wL
t, (1 - 
τ
t )µ
t) but where τ
t is expressed as a function of (w
t, w
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− =  is the highest sustainable value of w, and therefore, without 




− > ′ }, w’ finite.
9 Hence, Φ is bounded above by Φ(w’, 0) and for all w
0 ∈ W’ and 










1) , ( lim β  exists in R ∪ {-∞} and (5.5) is 
well defined. Moreover, as shown in Appendix 1, if c1 + c2 ≤ 1, Φ is strictly concave. 
Thus, we henceforth assume: 
Assumption 4: c1 + c2 ≤ 1. 





































γ β            (5.6) 
where v(w) denotes the solution to FE. We now prove that the function v(w) = φ + ψ 
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The postulated function solves FE if  
                                                 
9 If c2 = 1, the state space is not bounded. However, by A3, c2 = 1 implies c1 = 0: education plays no 
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We now have:
10 
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βc2)]log w
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Proof. 1. Notice that lim sup t→∞ β
t v(w
t) = lim supt→∞ β
t {φ + [1/(1 - βc2)]log w
t}. 
Clearly, limt→∞ β
t φ = 0. Moreover, [1/(1 - βc2)] lim supt→∞ β
t log w




0) = [1/(1 - βc2)] limt→∞ β
t [logk
t + logw
0]. Given that limt→∞ β
tt logk 
= 0, it follows that lim supt→∞ β
t v(w
t) = 0, for all feasible sequences {w
t}t=0,1,…. 
Next, as shown in App.1, the sequence {w*



















 and (b) limt→∞ β
t 
v(w*
t) = 0. Hence, by the theorems on dynamic optimization (see e.g. Stokey and 
Lucas, 1989, pp.72-5), v(w
0) = v*(w
0).  
2. The second part of the proposition is an immediate consequence of the first.￿ 
                                                 
10 An alternative proof of P3 is provided in App.1, based on the Euler equations.  18 
As concerns the relationship between equality and growth:
11 
Corollary 1. Let A1’, A2’, A4 hold. In an egalitarian economy with wL
0 = wH
0, the 





























We now proceed to study the program (5.4) when wL
0 ≠ wH
0, i.e. ρ
0 > 1. Let 
now W ⊆ R
2 denote the state space, with generic element w = (wL, wH) and let Γ: W → 
W denote the feasibility correspondence, where now 
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and if v*(wL
0, wH
0) denotes the supremum function, we can write SP as  



































     (5.8) 
Again, define a vector w’ = (wL’, wH’), with wL’ and wH’ finite and such that 
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− > ′ . Without loss of generality, we 
restrict the analysis to the subset W’ = {w ∈ W| w ≤ w’}. Hence, Φ is bounded above 
by Φ(wL’,  w’H, 0, 0) and for all w
0 ∈ W’ and all feasible sequences {w
t}t = 0, 1, …, 
                                                 
11 If c2 = 1 we get unbounded growth (provided k ≥ 1). However, as argued in fn. 9, this case can be 
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1 1 ) , , , ( lim β  exists in R  ∪  {-∞} and (5.8) is well defined. 
Moreover, Φ is differentiable in all arguments and, by A4, strictly concave. 
We now prove: 
Proposition 4. v*(wL
0, wH
0) is increasing in both arguments. Moreover,  
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where φ is given by (5.7). 
Proof. 1. Let {wL
t,  wH
t}t=0,1,… denote a feasible path of the states, given initial 
conditions (wL
0, wH




0, the path {w’L
t, 
w’H
t}t=0,1,… such that w’L
t = wL
t, ∀ t ≥ 1, w’H
t = wH


































, and since this is true for 





2. Firstly, notice that, by P3 and the monotonicity of v*, it follows that v*(wH
0, wH
0) = 
φ + 1/(1 - βc2) log wH
0 ≥ v*(wL
0, wH
0). Secondly, notice that it is always feasible to 



















// . Hence, by P3,  


































































and maximizing the right hand side with respect to τ
0 the result follows. ￿  20 
As concerns the optimal path of the controls, we now prove  
Lemma 1. Let A1’, A2’ hold. For any finite t, in the optimum, rL
t > 0 and 0 < τ
t < 1. 




t, (1 - τ
t)[fL wL
t + fH wH
t]) = - ∞, ∀τ
t ∈ [0, 1], while, by A1’, rL
t 
= 0 or τ
t = 0 imply wL
j = 0, ∀ j ≥ t + 1, and hence in the optimum rL
t > 0 and τ
t > 0. 
Given the boundedness of F, a similar argument can be used to prove that τ
t < 1.￿ 
Our strategy to solve (5.8) will be to recursively construct a function v(wL
0, 
wH




0). As a first step, 
consider the Euler equations. Given the inequality constraint on wages, it is more 






t+1) can be written as 
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t+2) subject to wH
t+1 ≥ wL
t+1.  21 
Actually, the Euler equations can be re-written, and made more intelligible, in 

























γ                    (5.9) 
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τ          (5.10) 
Consider t = 0. Given that ρ
0 = 1 ⇒ ρ
t = 1, ∀ t > 0, we conjecture that there 
exists a number  1 0 ≥ ρ  such that if  ] , 1 [ 0
0 ρ ρ ∈  then in the optimum ρ
1 = 1, and thus ρ
t 
= 1, ∀ t > 1. From the dynamic constraints it is possible to express rL
t as a function of 
ρ
t and ρ
t+1. Thus, substituting for rL
0 and rL
1 in (5.10) and setting ρ
1 = ρ
2 = 1, a 
necessary condition for, ρ
1 = 1 to be optimal is  
0
1 ) ( 1
1
1






− H H c
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τ               (5.10’) 
Next, by P3, if ρ
1 = 1 then in the optimum τ
1 = τ
* ≡ βc1/[(1 - γ)(1 - βc2) + βc1]. 
Hence, by (5.9) τ
0 = τ
























L c c f
c                (5.10’’) 
Given the parameter restrictions, ρ0 1 > , moreover  0 ρ  is higher, the higher γ 
and the lower fL, β, and c2. We can now prove:
13 
Proposition 5. Let A1’, A2’, A4 hold. If  ] , 1 [ 0
0 ρ ρ ∈  then in the optimum τ
t = τ* = 
βc1/[(1 - γ)(1 - βc2) + βc1], ∀ t, and ρ
t = 1, ∀ t ≥ 1.  
                                                 
13 We adapt the proof of Thm.4.15 (Stokey and Lucas, 1989, p.98) to the case of a corner solution.  22 
Proof. Let ∆ denote the difference between the objective function evaluated at {w*L
t, 
w*H
t}t=0,1,…, the path of the two states in the proposed solution, and at {wL
t, wH
t}t=0,1,…, 







i, J = L, H, i = t, t + 1. By the 
concavity of Φ 
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t+1, ∀t, the first term on the right hand side is non-
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and therefore, ∆ ≥ 0. ￿ 
Hence, if  ] , 1 [ 0
0 ρ ρ ∈ , define v0: W’ → R as 






























where φ is given by (5.7). Moreover, let τ ρ 00 10 1 :[ , ] [ , ] →  and 
+ → R ] , 1 [ :
0 0 ρ r  denote 
the optimal control functions, where τ0(ρ


















=  and 
therefore the optimal redistributive policy depends only on the wage ratio, ρ
0.
14  
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where ϖ0,L: W’ → R+ and ϖ0,H: W’ → R+ are the optimal wage functions, if  ] , 1 [ 0
0 ρ ρ ∈  





the optimal values of wL
1 and wH
1, respectively. More explicitly,  
                                                 
14 Notice that r0 is the optimal rL
0. The optimal rH
0 can be derived from the constraint fLr0 + fHrH
0 = 1.  24 
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Hence, v0 is strictly increasing in both variables and, as shown in Appendix 2, 
strictly concave. Moreover, it is straightforward to show that if  ] , 1 [ 0
0 ρ ρ ∈  v0 solves
15 










Φ β  
at the corner solution ρ
1 = 1, and τ
1 = τ*. Assuming v0 to be the value function if 
] , 1 [ 0
0 ρ ρ ∈ , in Appendix 3 we prove that there exists an interval  ] , ( 1 0 ρ ρ  such that if 
ρ
0 ∈  ] , ( 1 0 ρ ρ , it is optimal to set  ] , 1 [ 0
1 ρ ρ ∈ , and therefore ρ
j = 1, j ≥ 2. Thus, if 
] , ( 1 0
0 ρ ρ ρ ∈ , where ϖ1,L:  W’  →  R+ and ϖ1,H:  W’  →  R+ denote the optimal wage 
functions, and define  R → ' : 1 W v  as 
    vww w fw fw v ww ww LH L L L H H LLH HLH 1




11 11 1 ( , ) log ( )log( ) ( )log( ) ( ( , ), ( , )) ,, =+ − + + − − + γ γ γ τ β ϖϖ  
and continue the iterative procedure, assuming that v1 is the value function on 
] , ( 1 0
0 ρ ρ ρ ∈ , and verifying that there exists a  2 ρ  such that, if ρ
0 ∈  (, ] ρ ρ 12 , it is 
optimal to set  ] , ( 1 0
1 ρ ρ ρ ∈ ,  ρ ρ
2
0 1 ∈[, ]  and ρ
j = 1, j ≥ 3. In general, in App. 3, we 
prove that in the solution to FE, there exist derive an infinite sequence of intervals 
(, ] ρ ρ kk −1  such that, if ρ
0 ∈ (, ] ρ ρ kk −1 , then ρ
k+1 = 1, k ≥ 0 (if k = 0, ρk− = 1 1).  
We can now prove: 
                                                 
15 We henceforth use the “max” notation because, as we shall see, the supremum is actually attained.  25 






t. For any finite ρ
0, in the solution to the program (5.3), equality 
is reached in a finite number of periods. Once equality is reached wages grow forever 
as described in P3 and converge in the limit to the steady state w  in C1.  
Proof. We need to show that the increasing function v(wL
0, wH
0) solving Bellman’s FE, 
obtained in Appendix 3 is the value function.  
Firstly, by the monotonicity of v, v(wL
t, wH
t) ≤ v(wL’, wH’), ∀ (wL
t, wH
t) ∈ W’. 
Hence, lim supt→∞ β
t v(wL
t, wH
t) ≤ limt→∞ β
t v(wL’, wH’) = 0. Next, by L1 and P5, the 
optimal sequence {w*L
t,  w*H
t}t=0,1… is bounded away from zero. Hence, by the 
monotonicity of v, limt→∞ β
t v(w*L
t, w*H





0) and the policies derived from v in 
App. 3 are indeed optimal.￿ 
In other words, the optimal path involves equating the wages of the 
contemporaneous members of the two dynasties in a finite number of periods: if ρ
0 ∈ 
(ρk−1,  ρk ], convergence occurs in k + 1 periods. Once equality is reached, human 
development continues forever. 
 
5. Conclusion. 
  Earlier, we remarked on the similarity between the present paper, Arrow 
(1973) and Dasgupta (1974) (A-D, henceforth). The main differences between A-D’s 
models and ours are: (1) A-D have a representative agent each period, and so the only  26 
issue is to maximin welfare of that agent’s descendents across time, whereas in the 
present model, there is an issue of intragenerational a s  w e l l  a s  intergenerational 
justice; (2) in A-D, agents care only about consumption, not about functioning (i.e., 
not about the wage per se); (3) in A-D, investment is modeled as capital investment, 
rather than educational investment. Mathematically, the main difference is that the 
planner has only one instrument each period in A-D, whereas in our model, she has 
two instruments. (This is, of course, due to difference (1) above.) Nevertheless, A-D’s 
results are qualitatively similar to ours: an increase in consumption over time is 
compatible with maximin only if the equalisandum is welfare, in which case parents 
care about the consumption stream of their entire dynasty. Thus, the present paper 
may be considered an intellectual descendent of Arrow (1973) and Dasgupta (1974). 
Our concern with intragenerational inequality, not expressed in the earlier 
literature, led us to deduce that, as long as individuals value their human capital as 
well as their consumption, then the maximin program will eventually equalize the 
levels of human capital of all individuals. We remark, however, that this result may 
well depend on our assumption A4, of non-increasing returns in the educational 
technology. 
  Let us recapitulate. One of the major foci of discussion in egalitarian theory of 
the last thirty years has been the nature of the equalisandum. The main participants in 
the discussion have moved away from taking welfare as that equalisandum, although 
it is important to note that Arneson (1989) has argued for choosing opportunity for 
welfare as the equalisandum. (‘Opportunity for welfare’ is, in general, quite different  27 
from ‘welfare’ as an equalisandum. That difference is due to differential effort, which 
in the present article, does not appear.) However, this debate has been carried out 
within the confines of a static environment, a ‘model’ with a single generation. Here, 
we have maintained that equality of opportunity, for whatever kind of condition, is an 
ethically viable conception in a multi-generation world, and that in such a context, it 
calls for equalizing opportunities across all types of adult, where an adult’s type is 
characterized by the date at which he is born and the SES of the family in which he 
grew up. It is beyond this article’s scope to argue that justice requires that a person 
fare no better than another simply by virtue of being born at a different date
16. An 
asymmetric version of this principle is familiar in discussions of sustainable 
development and environmental preservation: we should leave to future generations a 
world as bountiful as the one left to us by our ancestors. But the other part is, we 
believe, just as compelling: we are under no ethical mandate to leave our descendents 
a world more bountiful than our own, although we may decide to do so if that 
increases our welfare by contemplating the happiness it will bring our children, and 
their children… 
  In studying the multi-generation world, we have learned that, if we choose 
what we call an objectivist equalisandum - we have taken ‘functioning’ as an 
appealing one - then equality of opportunity for that condition implies there will be 
no further human development, where human development is conceived of not as an 
                                                 
16 This is contestable. Some argue that equality of condition among living persons is all that an 
egalitarian ethic requires. One rationale is that self-esteem is affected by comparing one’s condition to  28 
increase in human welfare, but rather in human capacities to function. Thus, two 
major characteristics of what comprises the good society, as it has been conceived of 
by egalitarians for several hundred years, are incompatible. We showed that if we 
equalize opportunities for welfare, where an adult’s welfare depends upon her own 
level of functioning and the functioning levels of a finite stream of her descendents, 
the unpleasant inconsistency continues to hold. If, however, we choose a thorough-
going kind of welfare as the condition for which opportunities should be equalized - 
one which declares that an individual’s welfare depends not just on his capacities and 
the capacities of his children, but rather on his own capacities and his child’s welfare 
- then human development and equality of opportunity are mutually consistent.  
  The most appealing solution to the unpleasant inconsistency is, we believe, to 
drop the objectivist requirement.
17 It is opportunities for welfare that we should 
advocate equalizing. This, incidentally, conforms to Arneson’s (1989) 
recommendation, although the reasons brought to bear here are entirely different from 
those he presents. But we must add that this escape from the unpleasant inconsistency 
is predicated upon a psychological premise - that adults care about their own 
functioning, and the welfare of their children.  
                                                                                                                                           
those of contemporaries, not to the dead, or to those not yet born. 
17 Before agreeing with us, however, the reader should consult Silvestre (in press), who works with a 
different economic environment from ours, in which, he shows, an increase in welfare over time and 
egalitarianism are consistent, even when adults do not care about the welfare of their children.  29 
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APPENDIX. 
Appendix 1: Proof that τ
t = βc1/[(1 - γ)(1 - βc2) + βc2], ∀ t, is optimal. 
First of all, let us prove: 
Lemma A.1: If c1 + c2 ≤ 1 then Φ(w
t, w
t+1) is strictly concave. 








































































































































Let Di denote the principal minor of order i of the Hessian: D1 > 0, ∀c1, c2: 
















c c c c . Hence, if 
c1 + c2 ≤ 1, J is convex and Φ is strictly concave. 
We can now prove: 
Proposition A.1: Let A1’, A2’, A4 hold. In the solution to (5.5) it will be τ
t = τ* 
≡ βc1/[(1 - γ)(1 - βc2) + βc2], ∀ t. 
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0       ( T . A 1 ’) 
and since τ
t = τ*, ∀ t, satisfies (E.A1’) and (T.A1’), by L.A1, the result follows.  
P.A1 implies that wk w
tc t c *( * ) ( * )
+ =
1 12 τ  is optimal for program (5.5), as 
claimed in P3. Actually, this result provides another way to derive v*(w
0). In fact,  
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and since by P.A1 
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and therefore v*(w
0) = φ + 1/(1 - βc2) log w
0, where φ is given by (5.7). 
 
Appendix 2: Proof that v0(wL
0, wH
0) is strictly concave. 
Proof. It suffices to prove that 
1 2 1 2
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 If  Di is the principal minor of order i of the Hessian: D1 < 0, while D2 > 0 
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Appendix 3: Analysis of Bellman’s equation. 
Firstly, we show that there exists an interval  ] , ( 1 0 ρ ρ   such that if ρ
0  ∈ 
] , ( 1 0 ρ ρ , it is optimal to set  ] , 1 [ 0
1 ρ ρ ∈ , and ρ
j = 1, j ≥ 2. 
A necessary condition for ρ ρ
1
























































































































































1, expressing the 






























while taking the FOC corresponding to wH
1 and substituting for the optimal τ
0: 
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1) is the optimal level of ρ
2, given  ] , 1 [ 0
1 ρ ρ ∈  (it can be derived from 
r0(ρ
1)) and we know that π0(ρ
1) = 1. Hence, define h10 1 :( , ) ρ →R+ as   33 
] ) ( [ ) 1 ( ] [
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i.e. we conjecture that h1(ρ
1) is the initial wage ratio, ρ
0, that makes it optimal to 
choose ρ
1,  ] , 1 [ 0
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Clearly, h1 is continuous and h1(ρ
1) > 0. Moreover, if ρ































As shown in App.5, h1 is differentiable and dh1(ρ
1)/dρ
1 > 1, ∀ ] , 1 [ 0
1 ρ ρ ∈ , 
and thus we can define  ) ( 0 1 1 ρ ρ h = , with  0 1 ρ ρ >  and  ρ ρ ρ 10 0 1 −≥− . Next, let 
π ρ ρ ρ 11
1
01 0 1 =→
− h :( , ] ( , ]. From the properties of h1, it follows that π1 is continuous, 
differentiable and strictly increasing, with π ρ π ρ 10 00 1 () () == . Hence, patching 
together π0 and π1 one obtains an increasing and continuous function. The optimal 
control functions are τ ρ ρ 10 1 01 :( , ] [ , ] → , and r10 1 :( , ] ρ ρ →R+, where τ1(ρ
0) = τ* and 
r1(ρ
0) can be derived from π1. Thus, if  ] , ( 1 0
0 ρ ρ ρ ∈ , define  R → ' : 1 W v , by 




, 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
1 H L H H L L H H L L L H L w w w w v w f w f w w w v ϖ ϖ β τ γ γ γ + − − + + − + =  
where ϖ1,L: W’ → R+ and ϖ1,H: W’ → R+ denote the optimal wage functions, for 
] , ( 1 0
0 ρ ρ ρ ∈ , which can be derived from τ1 and r1. 
 Notice  that  v1 is continuous and, as shown in App. 4, strictly concave. 
Moreover, if ρ ρ
0




0), and the two functions can be 
patched together. Finally, from the differentiability of v0 it follows that v1 it is 
continuously differentiable on ρ ρ ρ
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0) solves FE on  ] , ( 1 0
0 ρ ρ ρ ∈ , we can proceed as above to 
show that there exists a value  2 ρ : ρ
0 ∈ (, ] ρ ρ 12 , in the optimum  ] , ( 1 0
1 ρ ρ ρ ∈ , and 
ρ
t = 1, t ≥ 2. In general, proceed by induction and consider the k + 1-th stage, k ≥ 1. 
Let hkk k :( , ] ρ ρ −− → 21R+ denote a differentiable function such that hk(ρ
1) represents 
the value of ρ
0 that makes it optimal to choose ρ ρ ρ
1
21 ∈ −− (,] kk  (if k = 1, ρk− = 2 1). 
Let dhk(ρ
1)/dρ
1  > 1, ∀ ρ ρ ρ
1
21 ∈ −− (,] kk and  define  ρ ρ kk h = − () 1  and 




12 1 :( , ] ( , ]. If ρ ρ ρ
0
1 ∈ − (, ] kk , define vk: W→ R as 
vww w f w f w v ww ww kLH L L L H H k k k LLH k HLH ( , ) [ log ( )log( ) ( )log( ) ( ( , ), ( , ))] ,,
00 0 0 0
1
00 00 11 1 =+ − + + − − + − γ γ γ τ β ϖϖ  
where ϖk,L: W’ → R+ and ϖk,H: W’ → R+ denote the optimal wage functions, for 
ρ ρ ρ
0
1 ∈ − (, ] kk , given the controls τ ρ ρ kk k :( , ] [ , ] − → 1 01, τk = τ* and rkk k :( , ] ρ ρ − → 1 R+. 
Let vk be strictly concave and continuously differentiable on ρ ρ ρ
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We conjecture that there exists a  1 + k ρ : if ρ
0 ∈  ] , ( 1 + k k ρ ρ , in the optimum 
ρ ρ ρ
j
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1) gives the optimal level of ρ
2, given  ] , ( 1
1
k k ρ ρ ρ − ∈ . Hence, as above, 
define hkk k +− → 11 :( , ) ρρ R+ as the function that gives the value of ρ
0 that makes it 
optimal to choose  ] , ( 1
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Clearly, hk+1 is continuous and hk+1(ρ
1) > 0. Moreover, if ρ ρ
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As shown in App.5, hk+1 is differentiable and dhk+1(ρ
1)/dρ
1  ≥ 1 
∀ρ ρ ρ 11 ∈ − (, ] kk . Hence, let ρ ρ kk k h ++ = 11 () , with ρ ρ kk + > 1 , and ρ ρ ρ ρ kk k k +− −≥− 11 .  36 




11 :( , ] ( , ]: πk+1 is clearly continuous, differentiable and 
strictly increasing, with π ρ π ρ kk k k + = 1() () . Thus, patching together πk+1 and πk one 
obtains an increasing and continuous function. From πk+1 it is immediate to derive 
the optimal rL
0 and therefore we can write the optimal control functions 
τ ρ ρ kk k ++ → 11 01 :( , ] [ , ],  τk+1 = τ*, and rkk k ++ → 11 :( , ] ρ ρ R+. Thus, if ρ ρ ρ
0
1 ∈ + (, ] kk 
define vW k+ → 1:' R, by 
vw w w f wf w v w w w w k LH L L L H H k kk LLH k HLH + ++ + =+ − + + − − + 1




00 11 1 ( , ) [ log ( )log( ) ( )log( ) ( ( , ), ( , ))] ,, γ γ γ τ β ϖϖ  
where ϖk+1,L: W’ → R+ and ϖk+1,H: W’ → R+ denote the optimal wage functions, 
for ρ ρ ρ
0
1 ∈ + (, ] kk, which can be derived from τk+1 and rk+1. If ρ ρ





0) and the two functions can be patched together. Moreover, vk+1 
is clearly continuous and as for v1, it is possible to show that it is strictly concave 
and continuously differentiable for ρ ρ ρ
0
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and if ρ ρ




































(, ) (, ) . 
  We can now define a function v: W’→ R such that if ρ ρ ρ
0





0), k ≥ 0 (if k = 0, ρ k − = 1 1). Given the properties of the vk’s, v is 
strictly increasing and continuously differentiable in both variables and strictly 
concave. Moreover, v solves Bellman’s FE by construction.   37 
 




t ∈ W’ and   w
t ∈ W’ and let w
t+1 ∈ Γ(w
t),   w
t+1 ∈ Γ(  w
t). The 
feasibility correspondence Γ is convex if and only if ∀ θ ∈ (0, 1) 
θ w
t+1 + (1 -θ)  w
t+1 ∈ Γ(θ w
t + (1 - θ)   w
t) 
  First of all, let us prove  






































and likewise for   w
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−− () ( ) . Let Di denote the principal minor of order i of the 
Hessian. Clearly, D1  < 0, while Dc c c c c c 21 2 1 2 1 2 11 0 1 =− − − ≥ ⇔ + ≤ () () . And a 
similar condition holds for the other constraint, proving the convexity of Γ. 
Proof. Consider w
0 ∈ W’ and   w
0 ∈ W’. Let w
1 ∈ Γ(w
0),   w
1 ∈ Γ(  w
0) be the 
corresponding optimal policies. Let w
1(θ) ≡ θ w
1 + (1 - θ)  w
1 and w
0(θ) ≡ θ w
0 + 
(1 - θ)  w
0. By L.A2, w
1(θ) ∈ Γ(w
0(θ)). Moreover 
vw w w vw ww ww vw
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θθ θ β θθ θ β θ
θθ βθ β θθ θ
≥+ > + − + >
+− + + − = +−
ΦΦ Φ
ΦΦ
  38 
where the inequalities derive from the fact that w
1(θ) is not necessarily optimal 
and from the strict concavity of Φ and v0, and the last equality is true since w
1 and 
 w
1 are optimal. 
 
Appendix 5. Proof that dhk+1(ρ
1)/dρ
1 > 1, ∀k ≥ 0. 
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where all terms but {Ak+1 –  Bk+1 –  Ck+1} are clearly positive and 
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Grouping the different terms according to the exponents of ρ
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  All terms in the formula of dhk+1(ρ
1)/dρ
1 apart from the last three are 
strictly positive. However, a sufficient condition for dhk+1(ρ
1)/dρ


















12 1 :( , ] ( , ]   and it represents the  40 
optimal value of ρ
2, given ρ ρ ρ
1
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  The right hand side of this expression can be written as 
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  Subtracting the latter expression from {Ak –  Bk - Ck}: 
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and again all terms in the latter formula, apart from the last three, are strictly 






























≥ , ∀ρ ρ ∈[, ] 1 0 . Therefore, since h10 1 ()= ρ , we can define  ) ( 0 1 1 ρ ρ h = , 
0 1 ρ ρ > , and it follows that ρ/h1(ρ) < 1, and thus dh1(ρ)/dρ > 1, ∀ρ ρ ∈[, ] 1 0 . 










≥1 , k   ≥ 1, 

















Therefore, since hkk k +− = 11 () ρ ρ , we can define hkk k ++ = 11 () ρ ρ ,  ρ ρ kk + > 1 , and it 
follows that ρ/hk+1(ρ) < 1 and thus dhk+1(ρ)/dρ > 1, ∀ρ ρ ρ ∈ − [, ] kk 1 . 